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Current Developments in Police Governance and Accountability in Ireland  
Vicky Conway and Dermot P.J. Walsh∗
Abstract
2005 saw the passing of landmark legislation for policing in Ireland – the Garda 
Síochána Act – which made substantial changes to the structures and operation of  
governance and accountability. It came on the heels of the greatest scandal ever faced by 
the Irish police. This paper sets out to assess critically the impact of that legislation. We 
begin by considering the nature of police reform and the various conditions necessary 
for successful change. We then contextualise the reforms in Ireland, considering the 
existing structures of governance and accountability and highlighting the numerous 
concerns which existed in relation to them. The focus then turns to the Morris Tribunal,  
which documented gross misconduct and corruption in one Garda division. We examine 
how this served as a major catalyst for reform in Ireland. The paper then turns to 
consider the reforms themselves providing an overview of the legislation and critiquing 
in depth a number of features: the clear centralisation of government control over the 
police, the limited independence of the new independent police complaints body and the 
failure to fully embed the reforms in a human rights agenda. We conclude by arguing 
that insufficient steps have been taken to address police governance and accountability  
in Ireland and that the best opportunity for such reform may have been missed. 
Introduction
That scandal can have a reformative capacity for policing organisations is neither unusual 
nor undesirable. In jurisdictions across the world, the swift action taken following the 
‘heat’ of a scandal has been well documented: the Scarman Report into the Brixton riots 
led to the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in England; the 
Mollen Commission in New York in the 1990s resulted in an overhaul of the internal 
affairs division, changes in training, and increased monitoring of police for corrupt 
activities; and in New South Wales, the Wood Commission resulted in a fundamental 
reform of policing[12]. Practice and theory has demonstrated, however, that it is easy in 
such pressurised and intense situations to implement programmes of reform which either 
fail to address the core problems which caused the scandal in the first place, or which 
 Vicky Conway, Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast, Dermot Walsh, Professor of Law, 
University of Limerick. 
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address the scandal but ignore other flaws in the system [36, 40, 6]. Reforms become 
targeted at individual officers under the bad apples thesis,1 or at one policing unit, 
believed to be inherently susceptible to corruption. Organisational and institutional 
defects go unchecked. 
In this paper, we examine this reform post-scandal process in the Irish context, where, 
over the past decade, the most substantial inquiry into policing since the creation of the 
police force, has exposed and documented corruption, abuse and negligence (the Morris 
Tribunal of Inquiry). The government and the force acted swiftly, implementing a 
detailed package of reform.2 In this paper we aim to assess critically the extent to which 
this programme will address problems within the Irish police force. Beginning with an 
overview of the international literature on police reform, we proceed to outline the 
context of policing in Ireland at the time of the inquiry. The reforms implemented by the 
government will then be analysed focusing on three aspects: police complaints, 
centralisation of governance and human rights developments. Finally, we will conclude, 
drawing on the international experience and literature, that these reforms will be 
insufficient to prevent future outbreaks of misconduct and corruption. 
Police Reform
A variety of factors can instigate police reform. Stenning and Shearing [44] differentiate 
primarily between factors which are internal and external to the police force:
- Internal: efficiency, service not force, community policing/ intelligence led 
policing/ evidence based policy/ reassurance policing, changes in police officer 
demographics, competition from private policing and scandals. 
- External: states in transition, move to human rights, best practice policing 
(globalisation/harmonisation), population booms/demographic changes, changing 
concepts of justice/move to restorative justice.
1 Stoddard [45; p.201] has defined the bad apples thesis as premised on the belief “that unlawful 
activity by police is a manifestation of personal moral weakness, a symptom of personality defects, or a 
result of recruitment of individuals unqualified for police work”. Newburn [36] has noted how it is 
invariably relied upon where a scandal has occurred but that the evidence, in most cases, proves 
otherwise. In New York the Knapp Commission dismissed claims by senior New York police 
management that the corruption in that instance was down to a few bad apples. Knapp declared that 
this position, which was borderline ‘official doctrine’, was an ‘obstacle to meaningful reform’.
2 In this chapter we focus on the reform implemented by the government. For a discussion of the 
reform implemented internal to the police see Fitzgerald [13], Conway [10] and Walsh [51].
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The nature of the driver will impact on the nature of the reform. For instance, questions 
around efficiency and a desire to have a service rather than a force will often lead to the 
implementation of managerialist reforms [41], while a state in transition, often attempting 
to leave a previously undemocratic system behind, may pay much greater attention to 
human rights concerns [37]. Where scandals are involved in prompting reform we may 
find that the reforms will be ‘knee-jerk’ and reactionary in nature, with little pause for 
reflection [43, 39, 36]. They will be directly targeted at the ills identified as being the 
cause and in need of remedying, though again with little reflection the target is unlikely 
to be accurately identified. Of course, as authors such as Newburn [36] and Punch [39] 
have repeatedly demonstrated, police misconduct which occurs on a scale which merits 
the label ‘scandal’ is invariably the result of attitudes and approaches to policing which 
are interwoven and embedded in the police culture. It is also a clear sign that internal and 
external oversight and governance mechanisms, however they exist, have failed. In spite 
of that, a common response, both from government and senior police management, is that 
the misconduct or corruption is in fact the result of a few bad apples and not in anyway 
institutionalised [45]. This is a destructive response which will be damaging for police 
morale and ignore the realities of problems at supervisory and management levels [36, 
39]. 
Punch has stated that in response to reform the following should occur: an energetic 
cleanup campaign; strong leadership; more powerful internal investigative capacity; 
enforcement of measures against police deviance either through internal disciplinary 
methods or criminal prosecutions, and a fundamental overhaul of the organisation, 
involving changes in personnel at all levels [39]. We would develop this further to 
emphasise a need to reflect on the accountability and governance of the organisation. In 
doing this, as was done so directly in Northern Ireland by the Patten Commission [38], 
and focusing on creating a system tied to central values of transparency, democracy, 
human rights and public consultation, the harm caused to public confidence by the 
scandal can be repaired, while at the same time most effectively ensuring that further 
scandal can be prevented. Recognising that no such thing as a ‘perfect’ system can be 
created, particularly where we are concerned with an evolving organisation (rolling 
personnel, changing regulatory powers) which operates within an evolving society, we 
further adopt the position exposed by others such as Newburn [36] and Chan [6] that 
reform should not be seen as a moment but a continual process. It is from this standpoint 
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that we now turn to consider reform of accountability and governance in Ireland in the 
past few years. 
Background
Prior to gaining its independence in 1922, Ireland was policed by two heavily centralised, 
government controlled constabularies: the Dublin Metropolitan Police [22] for Dublin 
and the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in the rest of the country [28, 1]. During the fight 
for independence these forces had been heavily attacked, viewed as emblematic of British 
power in the country.3 They were replaced soon after independence, and from 1925 
onwards the country has been policed by a single national force: the Garda Síochána.4  
In many respects the Garda Síochána was modelled on its RIC predecessor.5 It was a 
national force; it was composed of a hierarchical pyramid of military style ranks with a 
Commissioner at the apex [48: p.15]. The Commissioner was directly answerable to the 
Minister for Justice, with no external involvement in governance. The force as a whole 
was under the tight control of the central government which enjoyed the power of hire 
and fire, not just over the Commissioner, but also over the ranks down to and including 
middle management level. The Department of Justice also exercised close control over 
the force on a day to day basis. There was no local or community or independent 
oversight of the force.6 Complaints, if there were any, were to be dealt with internally.7
Important differences from the RIC were that the Garda Síochána was generally 
unarmed8 and it served a directly elected government, rather than a despotic government, 
3 According to Lowe [24] in 1920/21 there were over 10,000 attacks on the RIC with 355 officers 
killed in that period. 
4 Meaning Guardians of the Peace. A member singular is called a garda and the plural is gardaí. The 
force was formally created by the Police Force Amalgamation Act 1925 which amalgamated the DMP, 
which had continued to exist until this time, and the Civic Guard / Garda Siochana, which had been 
created in 1922 to replace the RIC. For a history of the force see Allen [1], McNiff [28], Brady [4] and 
Breathnach [5]. 
5 This was quite a deliberate decision as many of those involved in deciding on the new force believed 
that until the national unrest, the force had operated well in the country. Further, the Police 
Organisation Committee was given just three weeks to plan for the new force making it difficult to 
deviate substantially, see Allen [1].
6 The need to make the force accountable is apparent in many speeches by the first Minister for Justice, 
Kevin O’Higgins, however, as the government was tasked at that point with building the full 
institutions, structures and laws for the State, this was not an issue perceived as taking priority. 
7 S.18 of the Police Forces Amalgamation Act allowed for the Commissioner to establish an inquiry to 
investigate ‘any charge or complaint of neglect or violation of duty’. 
8 The Civic Guard as established in 1922 had in fact been an armed force but following a mutiny of 
recruits in Kildare Barracks an inquiry was held and recommended that the force be unarmed. See 
Allen [1]. Members of the Special Branch continue to be armed.
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based in Dublin castle.9 Michael Staines, the first Commissioner of the force, declared 
that the force would ‘succeed not by force of arms but on its moral authority as servants 
of the people.’ There was also a close identity and bond between gardaí and the 
community. One of the first Commissioners of the force, Eoin O’Duffy, worked hard to 
create a police force which was emblematic of the Irishness which, it was claimed, 
British rule had oppressed [27]. To this end, members of the new force were pioneers, 
spoke and taught Irish, excelled at Irish sports and were devoutly religious, going on 
pilgrimages to Rome and Lourdes. Indeed, Allen asserts that it was the suppression of the 
distillation of poitín, which had become widespread and destructive of communities 
during the Civil War period, that enamoured the new force to the public in the first 
instance [1]. This was despite the fact that it was also the State’s security service, the eyes 
and ears of the political establishment. Unlike other jurisdictions there was no division 
between the State functions of policing and security. In the newly formed State, which 
was opposed and overtly challenged by many who had contested the creation of the 
border with Northern Ireland, the Special Branch was an important and active division.10
From 1925 up until at least the 1970s there was virtually no change in the status, 
structures, management, values, policies or practices of the Garda Síochána. The Conroy 
Commission of 1970 introduced substantial changes on matters such as pay and working 
conditions [7],11 following serious unrest within the force,12 but there were no changes 
introduced which related to governance or accountability. It was as if the force was 
frozen in time; much of the 20th century just seemed to pass it by. On the other hand, it 
also managed to escape any serious crisis in public confidence. With the outbreak of the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland in 1969 and the consequent overspill of crime and 
subversive activity into the Republic, resulting in the deaths of a number of gardaí in the 
1970s and 80s, the first since the 1930s, the force resumed the position of guardians and 
9 Indeed, officers of the RIC were often referred to ‘the Castle’s men’, in reference to Dublin Castle, 
where the British administration in Ireland was based. 
10 Breathnach [5] discusses allegations of abuse of detainees by Special Branch men and how at times 
in the 1930s they were not welcome in certain parts of the country. 
11 The Conroy Commission introduced over-time payments for the first time, introduced a 42 hour 
working week, deemed some stations as ‘not fit to live in’, as well as recommendations on recruitment, 
training, accommodation and discipline. The changes brought about in the wake of Conroy have been 
described by McNiff [28] as ‘herald[ing] a new era’.
12 In the late 1960s nearly 1000 officers participated in go-slow protests, and gathered in the Macushla 
Ballroom, attending a meeting which had been banned by the Commissioner, to express their 
dissatisfaction at pay and working conditions. It culminated in the dismissal of 11 leaders who were 
only reinstated after the intervention of the Arch-Bishop of Dublin.
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defenders of the State.13 They effectively became untouchable in terms of criticism. 
While there were occasional controversial incidents and practices, most notably 
allegations of a ‘Heavy Gang’ using force to extract information and confessions from 
IRA suspects in the late 1970s,14 it was the 1980s before it was finally accepted that there 
was a need for independent oversight of the handling of citizen complaints against gardaí; 
and even then the model introduced was a very mild one. 
The Garda Siochana Complaints Board was created largely in response to two events. In 
1984, in what became known as the Kerry Babies Case, a young woman and her family 
gave false, detailed confessions to the murder of a new born baby. This was the subject of 
an investigation by a Tribunal of Inquiry which failed to attach any significant blame to 
the gardaí involved [25]. That same year the Criminal Justice Act gave gardaí a general 
power of arrest without charge. Significant opposition to this increase in Garda powers 
was only assuaged by the promise that the powers would only be brought into force in 
conjunction with an independent mechanism for the investigation of complaints against 
gardaí. The “independent” Complaints Board which ensued was composed of the Garda 
Commissioner (or his nominee) and government appointees. It relied on gardaí to 
conduct investigations on foot of complaints made by members of the public, but had the 
power to establish tribunals to adjudicate on possible breaches of the disciplinary code 
disclosed by such investigations. The lack of real independent investigation, compounded 
by serious under-resourcing which caused the Board to cease work on occasion, made for 
a gravely inadequate system.15 The Board itself called for its replacement with a more 
independent body on numerous occasions and it was the subject of intense criticisms 
from NGO’s, academics and civil liberties groups [48].
The picture changed dramatically throughout the 1990s, as the force was hit with a steady 
stream of allegations, which increasingly challenged its benign image and raised serious 
13 As one Minister for Justice stated: “There is nothing between us and the dark night of terrorism but 
that Force. While people in this House and people in the media may have freedom to criticise, the 
Government of the day should not criticise the Garda Síochána” (Noonan, Dáil Eireann, 10 November 
1987).
14 The existence of the gang has always been denied by Garda management and the Department of 
Justice, but was exposed by the Irish Times in February 1977 who documented accounts of prisoners 
who had been subjected to torturous interrogation techniques. “Gardaí using North-style brutality in 
Interrogation Techniques” (14 February 1977), “Beaten by Six Guards” (14 February 1977), “Heavy 
Gang used New Act to Intensify Pressure on Suspects” (15 February 1977), “Claustrophobia Victim 
says Gardaí Shut Him in Locker” (16 February, 1977).  
15 Irish Times, 16 December 1989.
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public concerns of a breakdown in discipline. Numerous convictions were overturned 
following evidence of Garda misconduct in the gathering of evidence.16 Interviews with 
suspects were not routinely recorded until the beginning of the twenty-first century [46]. 
The use of force by Irish police officers was repeatedly documented by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) on visits in 1993, 1998 and 2003. It has 
been the subject of more inquiries and investigations over the past ten years than it 
experienced over its previous 80 year history. Simultaneous to the emergence of 
allegations investigated by the Morris inquiry, a Tribunal of Inquiry was appointed to 
investigate the shooting dead of John Carty, a man suffering from serious mental illness, 
at a barricade incident in Abbeylara in April 2000 [2]. The Tribunal Chairman, Mr. 
Justice Barr, found that the scene was poorly managed and operational decisions were not 
properly made. On May Day 2002, the Garda handling of a street protest in Dublin 
resulted in the prosecution of seven gardaí for assault on protestors [15; p.11]. In 2005, 
Hugh Hartnett SC was appointed to conduct an inquiry into the death of Brian Rossiter, a 
14-year-old who died following time in Garda custody [21]. In May 2005 a Commission 
was established to investigate how Dean Lyons, a homeless heroin addict, who was 
considered borderline mentally handicapped, could have made a false confession to 
murder while in Garda custody [3]. The most significant and damaging of these inquiries 
was the Morris Tribunal.
The Morris Tribunal
Richard Barron was injured on a roadside in Donegal in October 1996 and died later in 
hospital [30]. Initially it was suspected to be a ‘hit and run’ incident, however, local 
gardaí soon decided, on the basis of rumour and false witness statements, and without a 
state autopsy, that two men, Frank McBrearty Jnr and Mark McConnell, had murdered 
him [30; para. 1.07]. Six weeks later, a dozen people from their two families were 
arrested in connection with the investigations. Dozens of complaints ensued about their 
treatment in custody. They alleged that a campaign of harassment had been mounted 
against them. Over one hundred prosecutions were brought against the McBrearty family 
in the coming years. 
16 See the cases of Peter Pringle, Damien, Marsh, Vincent Connell, Fred Flannery, Dean Lyons, Nora 
Wall, Frank Shortt, and, perhaps most contentiously, Paul Ward who had been convicted in relation to 
the murder of journalist of Veronica Guerin. 
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In early 1999, while these prosecutions were still making their way through the courts, 
questions began to appear in the media and in the Dáil (the lower House of the Irish 
Parliament) about Garda methods in Donegal,17 including allegations which went beyond 
the handling of Mr Barron’s death. The Minister for Justice indicated that Assistant 
Commissioner Carty was conducting an internal investigation. This extended to 
allegations that gardaí had planted fake IRA bomb finds on both sides of the border for 
the purposes of self-promotion. The opposition parties in Parliament repeatedly pushed 
the Minister to establish a Tribunal, but this was resisted.18 In November 2001 an 
opposition motion to set up a Tribunal resulted in the closest vote in the history of that 
government.19 Eventually in March 2002, almost five and a half years after Mr Barron 
died, the establishment of the Tribunal was announced. The terms of reference, however, 
excluded Garda Headquarters, the Department of Justice and the Minister for Justice 
from its remit.20 
The Tribunal, chaired by Justice Frederick Morris, former President of the High Court, 
began work in July 2002 and over the next six years, heard over 600 witnesses, and 
produced 8 reports totalling over 4,000 pages. The reports provide the most frank, 
balanced and critical account of policing in Ireland written by a judicial figure. The 
findings in each report are highly damning of the Gardaí, at both rank and file and senior 
level. 
In his first report Justice Morris found that two officers used a woman, whom they 
pretended was a member of the IRA, to plant fake bombs/bullets/weaponry at locations 
on both sides of the border on at least six occasions [29]. Senior officers were heavily to 
blame for failing to investigate the status of this woman: had they done so it would have 
been clear that she was not a genuine informer and their deception would have been 
uncovered [29; para 1.430]. Their supervision of the use of informants and of the 
investigation of bomb finds was found to be woefully inadequate. Where some officers 
tried to raise concerns, there was nowhere for them to turn. The promotion of unsuitable 
17 See for instance T. Brady, ‘Hoax bomb among claims against Gardaí in probe’ The Independent, 16 
April 1999, Deputy Jim Higgins, Dáil Éireann, 05 May 1999, Vol. 504 Col. 156; Higgins, 12 October 
1999, Vol. 509, Col. 24; O’Shea, 12 October 1999, Vol. 509, Col. 153; Stagg, 23 November 1999, Vol 
511, Col. 579; Higgins, 16 December 1999, Vol. 512, Col. 1973.
18 Jim Higgins, Dáil Éireann 07 March 2000, Vol. 515 Col. 1326
19 Deputies Shatter and Howlin 20 November 2001, Vol. 544 Col. 581
20 Dáil Éireann, 28 March 2002,Vol. 551, Col. 926
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officers was heavily criticised [29; para 1.43]. Revealing how embedded the ‘blue wall of 
silence’ was in the Garda, many of the officers in question told the Tribunal a ‘tissue of 
lies’ [29; para 6.32]. Indeed, one officer infamously stated under questioning that, ‘you 
don’t hang your own’. This wall would dog the tribunal at every stage of its 
investigations. 
In his second report Justice Morris found that following Mr Barron’s death local gardaí 
had failed to attend the scene promptly (in one case because they were in the pub while 
on duty) [30; para 3.53], failed to preserve the scene [30; para 3.122], failed to conduct an 
autopsy [30; para 4.31], were blinded by tunnel vision [30; para 3.165], secured a false 
witness [30; para 1.32], made extortion phone calls [30; para 6.86], unlawfully arrested a 
dozen people nearly all of whom were abused in custody [33]. The decision to arrest and 
charge members of the McBrearty family for murder was based on rumour and false 
witnesses. Those arrested suffered abuse of both a physical and mental nature, involving 
pushing, name calling, sensory deprivation, and the showing of Mr Barron’s autopsy 
photographs [33; para 3.144]. A false confession was secured in one interview [33; para 
7.390], and in another a fake confession was shown to a detainee [33; para 4.183]. Over a 
period of years following the investigation, gardaí mounted a campaign of harassment 
against the families involved. The McBrearty’s pub and nightclub received 
disproportionate law enforcement attention from the local gardaí [34; para 9.37]. Drugs 
were planted on one family member [34; para 7.121]. Morris described the investigation 
of Mr Barron’s death as ‘corrupt in its leadership ... prejudiced, tendentious and utterly 
negligent in the highest degree.’ [30; para 1.40] At the time of the establishment of the 
Tribunal the data on computer systems was amended so that the McBreartys were no 
longer listed as suspects in the case; but those affected were not informed of this decision. 
It remains unknown who killed Mr Barron, although the Tribunal has confirmed that he 
died by a ‘hit-and-run’ incident, and not murder. 
In his third report, Morris found that gardaí had conspired to set up a licensing violation 
in McBrearty’s pub and nightclub. It also found that a member of the family was falsely 
accused of threatening a witness by delivering a letter which contained a silver bullet 
[33]. This allegation had been made at the behest of officers involved in the Barron 
investigation. False expenses for court appearances were paid to the civilian witness in 
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the subsequent proceedings, and this was later blamed on a dead officer; a matter which 
was described by Morris J as ‘disgraceful’ [33; para 2.171].
The fourth report dealt with an incident in which a fake bomb was planted on a 
telecommunications mast to secure arrests of local people who had been involved in 
protests against the erection of the mast [32]. The Tribunal suspected that this bomb had 
been planted by the officer who found it, and who tampered with the substances within 
the bomb, by conducting tests on it when it should have been submitted to the appropriate 
labs for forensic testing [32; para 1.41]. The next report focused on how a weapon was 
dangerously planted on a traveller campsite for the purpose of securing arrests for an 
unconnected case [31; para 3.147]. The warrants for the search which located the weapon 
were, the Tribunal held, either handed blank to an officer or completed after the fact [31; 
para 3.100]. When suspicions arose over this incident, other officers offered a false alibi 
for the officer considered to be responsible for planting the weapon [31; conclusions]. 
The travellers arrested as part of the operation made allegations of ill-treatment in Garda 
custody. The Tribunal found that officers made derogatory remarks about their 
background [31; conclusions].
The Tribunal was also tasked with examining the response of the Garda Complaints 
Board to complaints made by the McBrearty family [35; para 11.104]. Justice Morris 
found that the mechanism was completely inadequate to deal with the complaints 
emanating from the Donegal division both for resource and procedural reasons. While it 
had made the best decisions possible in the circumstances it was simply not equipped to 
deal with the scale of the problems. Procedurally, the Tribunal was critical of the fact that 
the investigating officer for the Board, a senior garda, was empowered only to collect 
statements from witnesses, and not to question them on any inconsistencies arising. 
While no concluding report was published by the Tribunal, a number of factors which 
contributed to its findings emerge to indicate that the problems identified are 
institutionalised within an Garda Síochána [10]. Justice Morris emphasised throughout 
the reports that none of these events could have occurred without the negligence of 
superiors. The blue wall of silence was endemic, hampering Justice Morris at every stage 
of his investigations, epitomised by the statement of Garda Leonard: ‘You don’t hang 
your own’ [29; para 1.49]. Particularly disconcerting was the finding that none of this 
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could be viewed as limited to Donegal [30; para 6.02]. The Tribunal concluded that there 
was no reason to suspect this was the case, that all officers were trained in the same way. 
Problems in promotion and transfer of officers were of serious concern as was the 
relationship between the Department of Justice and Garda Headquarters.
The Garda Síochána Act 2005
While the Morris Tribunal was sitting, the government proceeded with the first overhaul 
of the legislative framework for police governance and accountability in Ireland since the 
1920s. No doubt, this was at least partly a response to the concerns that led to the 
establishment of the Tribunal and its ongoing revelations. Requirements under the Good 
Friday Agreement to harmonise police accountability frameworks North and South of the 
border, international human rights obligations and the growing international trend 
towards civilian investigations of complaints against the police were also influential. The 
new framework was given legal force by the Garda Síochána Act 2005, which was 
enacted following the publication of just two of the reports of the Morris Tribunal. 
From an accountability perspective the most attractive features of the Act are a reform of 
the complaints procedure (considered in detail below); the establishment of a Garda 
Inspectorate with the task of inspecting aspects of the operation of the force to ensure the 
efficient use of resources; and the introduction of local police-community consultation 
committees ‘to serve as a forum for consultations, discussion and recommendations on 
matters affecting the policing of the local administrative authority area’ [14; s.36]. 
Further features formalise existing practice. These include requirements on the 
Commissioner: to submit an annual report to the Minister [14; s.46]; to report to the 
government on any aspect of policing [14; ss.40 and 41]; and to keep the Minister 
advised on any significant developments likely to affect the preservation of public peace 
and order, the life and security of persons in the State, the security of the State or public 
confidence in the Garda [14; s.41]. The Act also empowers the Minister to appoint a 
person to inquire into any aspect of the administration, process or procedure of the Garda 
where he believes public concern exists [14; s. 42]. This is in addition to the investigatory 
powers of the Inspectorate and the Ombudsman Commission.
The Act modernises Garda governance, but it has done so in a manner which has 
concentrated police power in the hands of central government [50]. On the one hand, the 
11
Act gives greater budgetary autonomy to the Commissioner, but it goes on to 
complement that by retaining the pre-existing controls and supplementing them with an 
array of controls and obligations that were previously missing from the legislation. So, 
for example, the Minister has been conferred with a power to issue binding directives to 
the police commissioner concerning any matter relating to the Garda Síochána [14; s.25]. 
The Commissioner is also under a duty to account fully to the Government and the 
Minister, through the Secretary General of the Department of Justice, for any aspect of 
his functions [14; s.40]. This includes a duty to produce Garda records and reports. 
Potentially, this could be used very effectively to deliver real accountability by cutting 
through Garda obstructionism. Equally, however, it could be used to inflict grave damage 
in the form of partisan political interference in the administration of criminal justice [51]. 
In addition, the Act also formally confers the Minister with powers to determine and 
revise priorities and targets for the force, and to direct the contents of Garda Strategy 
Statements and Annual Policing Plans [14; s. 20]. In practice, the Minister has been 
exercising such powers for some years without explicit statutory authority. The Act also 
confirms the status of the force as a civilian police service and the State’s security 
service.21
The combined effect of these provisions is to render the Commissioner explicitly and 
unmistakeably subordinate to the Minister for Justice and/or the government on all 
aspects of the management of the force and in the contents of policing policies, methods 
and operations [50]. They lay the basis for the national police force being used as a tool 
of the central political establishment. The potential impact of a politicised police force 
has been witnessed abroad. The policing of the miner’s strike in England in the 1980s, for 
instance, where the police enforced the policy of the government, rather than 
investigating crime and defending the human rights of citizens, had severe negative 
consequences for the confidence of the public in the police and the notion of policing by 
consent [42]. This danger could have been offset in the 2005 Act by the establishment of 
an independent policing board or police authority as a buffer between the government 
and the force – such as that in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, the opportunity was not 
taken. The retention of the security service within the police force is similarly 
problematic.
21 S.7 of the Act identifies clearly the functions of the force which are to preserve peace and public 
order, to protect life and property, to vindicate the human rights of individuals, protect the security of 
the State, to prevent crime, bringing criminals to justice and ensuring road safety. 
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Further, Justice Morris had specifically recommended that the relationship between the 
Department and Garda Headquarters needed to be revised so as to enhance the levels of 
trust between them. Since then, however, there has been a marked deterioration in the 
relationship between some sections of the force and government. In particular, the 
Minister for Justice cancelled his attendance at the 2010 Annual Conference of the Garda 
Representative Association when he learned that the outgoing President of the 
Association intended launching an unprecedented political attack on the government in 
his address. The text accused the government of national sabotage and treachery. It also 
said that gardaí and other public sector workers had endured an “unrelenting, distasteful 
and vitriolic attack from the Government and their wealthy cronies” during the past year. 
The Minister, in turn, described the speech as “an unprecedented political intervention” 
by a Garda representative “which have no place in a modern democracy”. He went on to 
say that they “besmirch the long-held excellent reputation that An Garda Síochána has 
earned for serving the people and political institutions of this State without fear or favour. 
No democrat could tolerate such political interventions by any member of a police force.” 
He also said that “the force is ill-served by such political interventions. In the light of 
these facts, it is impossible for me to attend the GRA conference”. The new arrangements 
under the 2005 Act are unlikely to engender trust in such an environment.
Probably the most innovative and exciting initiative in the Act is the establishment of an 
independent three person Ombudsman Commission which has extensive police powers to 
conduct its own investigations into alleged wrongdoing by gardaí. Replacing the much 
criticised Complaints Board this body represents an overhaul of the accountability of the 
police as regards complaints from the public. 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission
On paper the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) has the potential to 
bring substantial independence to the investigation of police complaints in Ireland, with 
legislative provision for all complaints against the police to be independently investigated 
[11]. It is a three-person body, with a staff of close to 100, which includes retired police 
officers from other jurisdictions and a number of gardaí on secondment to the office. It 
began receiving complaints in May 2007 and to date has received twice as many 
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complaints on an annual basis as its predecessor.22 There may be numerous reasons for 
this growth but the results of GSOC’s public survey, which found that 82% of people 
believed the new system is independent, suggest that this growth can be attributed to 
greater public confidence in the independence of the system [18; p.30]. This is a finding 
replicated in other jurisdictions: complaints in the police in England and Wales, and 
Northern Ireland rose at similar rates following the establishment of the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission and the Office of Police Ombudsman for Northern 
Ireland respectively. 
The procedure established by the 2005 Act enables the Commission to refer a complaint 
to informal resolution/mediation where it is less serious [14; s.90], return it to the Garda 
Síochána for an investigation which may or may not be supervised [14; s.94], or it can 
conduct two types of investigation itself, the form depending on whether [14; s.95] or not 
[14; s.98] the complaint appears to involve an offence. Where it appears to involve an 
offence GSOC officers have similar powers to a police office, including arrest, detention, 
interrogation and the taking of samples, which can be used in respect of both police 
officers and members of the public. Following any of these investigations GSOC makes 
recommendations to the Commissioner on disciplinary action or, if appropriate, submits a 
file to the DPP.
The figures for the first two years indicate how GSOC have to date been using their 
powers:23
Status Complaints
Inadmissible 34.6%
Admissible: 65.4%
S90 Informal 
Resolution
14%
S.94 Supervised 8%
S.94 Unsupervised 37%
S.95 0.2%
S.98 40.5
22 This figures are combined from the Annual Reports published in 2008 [16] and 2009 [17] as well as 
caseload data published on the GSOC website available at http://www.gardaombudsman.ie/gsoc-garda-
ombudsman-CaseThroughput-March2010.htm 
23 As above.
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The first note-worthy point of these figures is the level of complaints being deemed 
inadmissible. While some of this will be accounted for by failure to submit a complaint 
within a given time or the complainant not being a person eligible to complain, the 
majority are deemed inadmissible because the substance of the complaint does not 
qualify under the Act. Complaints must relate to either suspected criminal behaviour or 
suspected breaches of the disciplinary code. In this, GSOC remains unchanged from the 
Complaints Board. Walsh argued over ten years ago for a new set of criteria to be 
introduced, as the disciplinary code was not designed with public concerns in mind [48; 
p.242, 8]. That a third of the complaints from members of the public who feel sufficiently 
aggrieved to make a formal complaint are being rejected is unlikely to enhance the 
confidence of the public in the police, which is a stated aim of GSOC according to the 
legislation [14; s.67].
Most disconcertingly in the context of GSOC being proffered as a new, independent 
body, these figures reveal that 45% of cases continue to be investigated by gardaí.  GSOC 
has focused its independent investigations on complaints appearing to involve criminal 
matters. If it is the case that resources are restricted, then this may be an understandable 
approach but it does not alter the fact that nearly half of complaints are not being 
independently investigated. This is compounded further by two factors. Firstly, even if 
GSOC does not have the resources to conduct more independent investigations it should 
be exercising its powers of supervision in the majority of cases, not the minority, as it is 
at present. Secondly, GSOC is looking for powers to ‘lease back’ less serious criminal 
matters to Garda investigation meaning that even more cases may be investigated by 
gardaí in the future [23]. 
The generally expressed concerns with police investigating police are firstly that police 
will not be willing or able to independently investigate fellow police officers and 
secondly, that even if they could/would, the public would not perceive this as 
independent. The former was abundantly clear in the Morris Tribunal: the officer 
assigned by the Complaints Board to investigate the complaints stated to the Tribunal that 
he simply did not believe that gardaí would do what was being alleged [35; para 12.104]. 
We would add two further concerns. Justice Morris expressed great dissatisfaction with 
the procedure applied for internal investigation of offences which empowered an 
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investigating officer merely to take statements from those involved without permitting 
any questioning on those statements [35; para 10.26]. Of those cases received by GSOC 
but investigated by gardaí there is no indication that the procedure has been amended. 
The investigation of almost half of all admissible complaints submitted to GSOC is 
conducted by gardaí using an inadequate system, where the investigator is merely the 
taker of statements. In addition to this, the European Court of Human Rights has held that 
where a complaint concerns a breach of a Convention right an investigation by police 
officers will not be an effective remedy, and thereby a breach of the complainants 
rights.24 A ‘lease-back’ of less serious criminal matters for investigation by gardaí runs 
the risk of a failure to provide an effective remedy and Ireland falling foul of the 
Convention.   
Other concerns can be expressed with the new system. Commissioners are appointed by 
the government, where an independent process would be preferred [23].25 The current 
Commissioners are all children of gardaí which could have negative consequences for the 
perception of independence. Concerns also exist that the body will be under-resourced, 
like its predecessor, which was forced on occasion to close due to a lack of resources 
[49].  
Many of the reforms of the complaints mechanism are commendable, and on paper this 
body has the potential to operate as a relatively independent complaints mechanism [11]. 
In practice however, it appears that too much emphasis has been placed on this 
mechanism to deliver Garda accountability [9]. As Vaughan [47; p.20] argues, in a 
holistic system the Ombudsman Commission would play a ‘vital’ role but it would be 
“much more minor than that envisaged in the debate on police accountability hitherto.” It 
would also appear that it is not operating as the independent mechanism it is purported to 
be. 
The broader human rights context
The reforms in the 2005 Act were complemented by a greater focus on the human rights 
agenda by Garda management. In 2002 a decision was taken to engage external 
24 Govell v. UK [1998] EHRLR 101; Khan v. UK [2000] 31 EHRR 1016.
25 This re-emerged in the appointment of Dermot Gallagher, a senior civil servant, to the commission, 
following the death of its first chair, Mr Justice Kevin Haugh. See for instance Mark Kelly’s letter to 
The Irish Times, 12 February 2009.
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consultants to conduct a human rights audit of the force. Their subsequent report 
provided a catalogue of human rights deficiencies across all aspects of Garda 
management and methods, and it detailed remedial measures that would need to be taken 
[51]. The Garda responded by preparing a plan to address the weaknesses. 
Commendably, both the report and the Garda plan were published.  
Undoubtedly, there have been some human rights improvements in Garda governance 
and accountability consequent on this report and other recommendations for reform. We 
have already seen the new complaints procedure and the other reforms effected on foot of 
the 2005 Act. These have been complemented by a new disciplinary procedure [17] and a 
new whistle-blowing mechanism [16]. There has also been: a significant injection of 
civilianisation at senior management levels, the establishment of a human rights 
champion at Assistant Commissioner level, the establishment of a Human Rights 
Advisory Committee and the formation of a professional standards unit within the force 
[51]. These have been reinforced by a range of commitments on matters such as human 
rights proofing of operational policies, the incorporation of impact assessment protocols 
for Garda actions and improvements in Garda education and training programmes [51].
It is difficult to determine the extent to which many of these have translated into 
meaningful human rights advances in practice, or whether they are little more than paper 
exercises offering appearance over substance [51]. What is certain is that most of the 
consultants’ recommendations on transparency have not been implemented. It is still the 
case, for example, that standing orders covering all aspects of Garda management and 
practices are not publicly accessible. The same applies to the existence and contents of 
Garda policies. Even with the creation of the Inspectorate and the Ombudsman 
Commission it remains difficult to access information which other jurisdictions take for 
granted as being within the public domain. One example is the operation of stop and 
search laws. While in the UK detailed information on when and why they are used is 
published, and is often the subject of academic research and study, no information on the 
use of this power is available for scrutiny in Ireland. For as long as such basic 
information is kept secret, transparent governance and accountability will remain elusive 
and the Garda will continue to be one of the most secretive police forces in the Western 
world.
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Conclusion
Undoubtedly the last five years has been a period of substantive Garda reform, both in 
terms of the legislative framework for police governance and accountability in Ireland 
and internal developments. The concern is however that Garda reform has had its 
moment, in the heat of the scandal, and as the Morris reports are relegated to recycling 
bins, so too is the impetus for change. There are a number of reasons why this is 
particularly worrying.
The Morris Tribunal was justifiably a real catalyst for change but it should not have been 
perceived as the sole basis for reform. That Tribunal was only examining one district and 
one particular set of cases. The full extent of misconduct in the Irish police has not been 
evaluated. Nor have we as a society engaged in discussions of what is expected of the 
Garda and what policing can realistically achieve. What is needed is an independent 
commission on policing; an initiative that all the major opposition parties have repeatedly 
supported. 
There is still much in the reform proposals of the Morris Reports that have not been 
implemented. Indeed, most of the reform was implemented after just two reports had 
been published, and so the contents of the later reports have been largely ignored. Little 
has been done to address the cultural deficiencies in the Garda. For instance, Justice 
Morris identified a blue wall of silence in most of his reports. The response has been to 
implement a duty to account, a whistleblowers charter and to reinstate the keeping of 
officer’s notebooks. These are procedural mechanisms which, while welcomed as 
necessary steps, will not engage in substantial cultural reform. As other jurisdictions have 
learned the difficult way, reform of culture takes continued training and education of all 
levels, an engendering of a new culture within management and supportive and reflective 
oversight [6]. Added to this must be a continuing awareness of changes in the society 
being policed which will impact on policing. Tick the box exercises cannot achieve this, 
particularly in the context of an Irish culture and society which economically has gone 
from boom to bust, where the ethnic make up is in fluctuation, where faith in institutions, 
long taken for granted, is disintegrating and where concepts of rights and democracy is 
flourishing. 
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Other specific recommendations, such as the calls for a full implementation of the 
PEACE model of interrogation have been disregarded. The system is being revised, but 
not as Justice Morris advised. His recommendations on how the law of police 
surveillance should be developed were ignored in recent legislative reform of that area 
[10; p.161]. Recommendations on tenure of service and treatment of persons in custody 
have also been ignored. And no discussions have been held on the findings as regards 
abuse of detainees, which receive continual reinforcement by the findings of the ECPT.
Instead we have a Garda Síochána Act which focuses on centralisation of government 
control over the force which can only lead to politicisation and will not assist in 
improving the relationship between Garda Headquarters and the Department of Justice 
[50]. New accountability mechanisms were introduced but as we have argued these are 
not sufficiently independent and, in fact, run the risk of encouraging the public to believe 
they are independent. 
As we emphasised in the introduction the broader context of any such reform must be 
examined closely to ensure balance between oversight and the powers being granted to 
the police. In the same period as these changes to accountability and governance have 
been made, a new ‘war’ has emerged in Ireland; a war on gangland crime, which the 
Minister has stated as being on a par with the seriousness of the Troubles. In 2009 alone 
six pieces of legislation were introduced which greatly expanded the powers of gardaí, in 
terms of surveillance, arrest and detention [8]. This has been done with minimal addition 
to safeguards and with concerns lingering over the extent to which human rights have 
been embedded in an Garda Síochána. Given that limitations have been placed on 
GSOC’s work on the grounds of security of the State, and that the justification for many 
of these new powers is security of the State, recent reforms are unlikely to be relevant in 
this context. 
Morris provided a very real opportunity to begin a realistic evaluation of policing in 
Ireland. Some of the new mechanisms such as the Inspectorate may have a lasting impact 
in this regard but we remain fearful that the chance to begin a long-term and effective 
reform process has been lost. Instead the police force has been brought more tightly 
under the control of the government. 
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